Hinkley Point: the’ horrendous deal’ behind the world’s most expensive power plant

The long speak: Structure Britains first new fast breeder reactor since 1995 will cost twice as much as the 2012 Olympics and by the time it is finished, nuclear power could be a stuff of the past. How could the government ten-strike such a bad deal?

Hinkley Point, on the Somerset coast, is the biggest house locate in Europe. Here, on 430 acres of muddy subjects scattered with towering cranes and bright yellow-bellied diggers, the first brand-new nuclear power plants in the UK since 1995 is slowly taking figure. When it is finally accomplished, Hinkley Point C will be the most expensive power plant in the world. But to contact that stage, it will need to overcome an extraordinary entangle of fiscal, political and technical difficulties. The programme was first proposed virtually four decades ago, and its progress has been glacial, having faced unrelenting opposition from legislators, professors and economists every step of the way.

Some pundits of the project have questioned whether Hinkley Point C’s nuclear reactor will even work. It is a new and controversial pattern, which has been dogged by interpretation both problems and has yet to start running anywhere in the world. Some experts believe it could actually prove impossible to erect.” It’s three times over costs and three times over season where it’s been built in Finland and France ,” does Paul Dorfman, from the UCL Energy Institute.” This is a flunked and failing reactor .”

Others have pointed to the cost. At present, the estimated total invoice for Hinkley Point C is PS20. 3bn, more than twice the London Olympics. To pay for it, the British government has entered into a complex fiscal arrangements with Electricite de France( EDF ), the vigor whale that is 83% owned by the French authority, and China General Nuclear Power Group( CGN ), a state-run Chinese energy company. Under this contract, British electricity consumers will be able repay billions over a 35 -year stage. Harmonizing to Gerard Magnin, a former EDF director, the French company identifies Hinkley as” a mode to acquire the British money the renaissance of nuclear in France “. He included:” We cannot rest assured that in 2060 or 2065, British pensioners, who are currently at institution, will not still be paying for the process of improving the nuclear manufacture in France .”

Many British spectators agree that the slew is ridiculously is good for EDF-” a abominable transaction, laughter” does Prof Steve Thomas, who works on energy policy at the University of Greenwich. But even insiders at EDF aren’t entirely happy with it. In the months before the EDF board finally signed off the deal in autumn 2016, the finance director abdicated, along with Magnin.” The Hinkley Point project remains very risky ,” Magnin told me. He is particularly concerned about EDF’s ability to complete the project before the current deadline of 2025.” Why have we reached this part ?” asked Magnin.” It is the construction of a house of cards .”

Not everyone has lost faith in the project. When John Hutton was business secretary in 2008, he announced that the government would encourage the” safe and cheap” development of nuclear reactors. Back then, he contended the bushes would be completed” well before 2020″, and wouldn’t receive a penny in subsidies from the British authority. Today, despite those earlier hopes having been broken, Hutton still lobbies for nuclear:” We’re not just causing power plant ,” he told me.” We are representing biography .”

But the incongruity of Hinkley Point C is that by the time it eventually starts running, it may have become obsolete. Nuclear strength is facing existential problems of all the countries, as the cost of renewable energies descend and their popularity changes.” The maths doesn’t work ,” remarks Tom Burke, former environmental policy consultant to BP and visiting professor at both Imperial and University Colleges.” Nuclear plainly doesn’t make sense any more .”

The story of Hinkley Point C is that of a series of decisions, taken by dozens of people over nearly four decades, which might have induced gumption in isolation, but today result in an virtually unfathomable scramble of the development of policies and aspirations. Promises have been made and transgressed, programmes have been adopted then declined then adopted again. The one thing that has been consistent is the projected cost, which has rocketed ever upwards. But if so many people have come to believe that Hinkley Point C is fundamentally flawed, the issues to abides: how did we get to this place, where billions of pounds have been droop into a project designed seems fewer and little petitioning with every year that elapses?


After acquiring the 1987 ballot, Margaret Thatcher’s government launched has the intention to privatise the entire electricity market. But in the months following this announcement, it became clear that selling off Britain’s three dozen nuclear units was going to pose a number of problems. A former civil servant closely involved with the privatization remembered the offend of discovering the sheer magnitude of health risks and costs associated with the creaking first generation of nuclear plants. Whereas government policy newspapers could massage anatomies and manufacture rosy juttings, the prospectus, which provided financial results for potential investors, had not been able bending the truth.” A authority article was one thing ,” said the former civil servant,” but if the figures were misleading in the prospectus, it is an offence. That was not at all like both governments article, to be honest. It was quite a moment for us all .”

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The dominate chamber at Hinkley Point A power plant, which opened in 1965. Photo: Matt Cardy/ Getty Images

By 1989, it was clear that Britain’s nuclear sector would not be privatised- business had little desire to take on the immense fiscal and practical jeopardies.” The decommissioning overheads are amazing ,” the former force secretary Chris Huhne told me.” In the 50 s and 60 s, they built them as if the latter are the pharaohs improving the pyramids. It was:’ We’re never going to have to take them apart .'”

In 1990, as the privatization of the electricity marketplace exited ahead, Britain’s nuclear power stations moved into a state-owned companionship. By then, the government was already deep into the construction of Sizewell B nuclear power station, on the Suffolk coastline. Hinkley Point C was next on the list.

Six years later, the older generation of nuclear power stations were transferred into another state-owned company, while a brand-new private company called British Energy stepped forward to take over the eight most modern nuclear power plants in the UK. As British Energy took over its ready-built assets, it announced it would make the planning agree for Hinkley Point C lapsing. Taking over existing nuclear power plants constituted financial appreciation; taking on the eyewatering costs of building new ones did not. The current nuclear power plants would lope until the end of their projected lifespans, and then something else would have to close the gap.

But soon after its privatisation in 1996, British Energy began to run into fiscal difficulties. By 2002, the new private companionship was in chaos, ultimately involving a PS3bn bailout from the government. If the idea of having” too big to fail” was to become a feature of Britain’s banking industry, it was already broiled into its nuclear business.


During Tony Blair’s second period as “ministers “, the Cabinet Office was tasked with examining the UK energy industry. When it extradited its report in February 2002, the meaning was clear: the costs and threat of building brand-new nuclear power plants should be left to the private sector organizations.” It used to say although nuclear shouldn’t be ignored, it was at present economically out of the question ,” answers Gordon MacKerron, professor of science and technology programme at the University of Sussex, who was an adviser on the review.

By the end of 2003, all government policy was pointed out that Hinkley Point C would never be built, and there was no prospect of any other brand-new nuclear power plants. It seemed certain that nuclear “havent had” future in Britain- which is why, when the governmental forces acted a volte-face 3 years later, so many spectators were startled.” Without any obvious change in the world, by 2006, its own position in government had been completely changed ,” MacKerron told me.” Nuclear ability had now become extremely beneficial, important and not uneconomic .”

One thing that had happened in the intervening years was a PR blitz by the nuclear manufacture, which had deployed ratings of lobbyists, including former legislators such as the former vigor diplomat Brian Wilson, to push the idea of a” nuclear renaissance” in the UK. Between 2003 and 2006, reads Andrew Stirling, professor of science and technology policy at Sussex University,” Britain accompanied the beginnings of a massive pro-nuclear lobbying and PR campaign that continues to this day .”

Through the media and advertising campaigns, key meanings were hammered dwelling. Renewables were intermittent and unreliable. Overseas gas imports were politically vulnerable. “Green” nuclear was the only conceivable course to thump carbon dioxide reduction targets. Keith Parker, who was then chief executive of the Nuclear Industry Association( NIA ), told the New Statesman that the 2005 ballot became a particular focus for swaying minds.” It gave us a good chance to raise the profile of nuclear power ,” he announced. In the months leading up to the election, a series of talks was organised at exclusive venues such as the Army& Navy Club on Pall Mall and St Stephen’s Club in Queen Anne’s Gate. Industry captains and experts came together to explain the benefits of nuclear to politicians and intensity reporters. The NIA( which is now chaired by John Hutton) took on the role of managing the influential all-party parliamentary radical- an informal gather of legislators- on nuclear energy.

In July 2006, the government U-turn arrived in the form of a brand-new program newspaper, The Energy Challenge, which declared that brand-new nuclear power plants would be necessary to help Britain reduce its carbon emissions and to ensure an uninterrupted, affordable supply of energy well into the future.

Greenpeace propelled a legal objection, claiming that the consultation process behind the government’s recommendation had been totally inadequate. The adjudicator presiding over the suit agreed, and in February 2007 regulated that the process had been “misleading”, ” very seriously shortcoming” and” procedurally unjust “. Blair accepted the decree, but was also pointed out that” this won’t alter the implementation of policies at all “.

Andrew Stirling believes that there was a crucial, predominantly unspoken, rationale for the government’s rediscovered rage for nuclear: without a civil nuclear industry, a society cannot keep armed nuclear capabilities. In other statements , no new nuclear power plants would spell the end of Trident.” The only countries in the world “that theyre” looking at large-scale civil power newbuild programs are countries that have nuclear submarine, or have an shown objective of acquiring them ,” Stirling told me.

Building nuclear submarines is a ferociously complicated business. It requires the type of institutional storage and technical expertise that can easily disappear without practise. This, in theory, is where the civil nuclear industry comes in. If new nuclear power plants are being built, then the skills and capacity required by the military will be maintained.” It looks to be the case that the government is deliberately engineering an environment in which electricity customers cross-subsidise this chapter of military insurance ,” Stirling told me.

In May 2007, the government published a newspaper titled” Meeting the vigor objection: a White Paper on intensity”, which reaffirmed its fervor for nuclear and declared that there had been” important changes in the economics of nuclear power “. In compare to the late 1980 s, the government claimed it was now being approached by” some vigour companionships carrying a keen interest in investing in brand-new nuclear power plants “.

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The Quantock hills in Somerset, looking towards the area of Hinkley Point. Photograph: Deeplyvibed/ Alamy Stock Photo

When Gordon Brown took over from Blair in June 2007, the switching to nuclear proceeded apace. As it happened, the brand-new prime minister’s brother, Andrew, was then the communications chairman for EDF, though a spokesman for Gordon Brown told him that at no part while “hes been” “ministers “” did he was never discuss energy policy with Andrew Brown “.

In January 2008, the proclamation entered. A new generation of nuclear power stations in the UK was devoted formal backing by the government.” It are members of the most exciting daytimes in my ministerial life ,” suggests Hutton.” Pastors do lots of important things all the time, but there are probably those moments in your ministerial profession when you sit back and think:’ Actually, this is going to have an intergenerational impression. This is going to affect the country 50, 60, 70 years after I’ve gone .'”

The development at the top of the list was Hinkley Point C.


Just as it was like Hinkley Point C would go ahead, the banking crisis started.” The disintegrate pretty well changed everything ,” Hutton told me. The private firms, such as E.ON and Centrica, which has hitherto expressed interest in funding the new nuclear power plants, plucked out. If the UK government wanted to go ahead, it would have to pay for the power plant itself. This was a ended leaving from its previous insisting that the private sector organizations would shoulder both the exploitation cost and probability.” It was agreed on one basis, and then they moved to another ,” suggests Molly Scott Cato, the Green MEP for the south-west of England.

Despite the financial chaos, the government was still have decided to draw Hinkley work.” There had to be a different direction felt ,” Hutton remarked. The key bit of the jigsaw was British Energy. The firm, which had been attracted back from near-collapse including the government in 2002, owned many of best available sites for building brand-new nuclear power stations. If the government wanted private companies to build nuclear power stations, it would have to sell British Energy to one of the companies.

Various purchasers were considered for British Energy in 2008, with EDF the keenest.” At one point, we tried to get Centrica and British Energy working in conjunction ,” replied a former senior civil servant.” But government departments very quickly realised it would be like two drinks bending together for backing. EDF was the best bet .” With no real plan B after the private sector had lost interest in Hinkley Point, the government suddenly felt itself in a feeble negotiating power.” They perhaps didn’t be anticipated that simply one developer, EDF, was prepared to go ahead ,” answered MacKerron.” So by definition, they were a little bit over a barrel .”

In September 2008, British Energy was sold to EDF. After months of long and difficult negotiations between EDF and a team of civil servants representing the UK’s interests in British Energy, and an earlier miscarried entreat, the French companionship paid PS1 2.5 bn to take over eight UK nuclear power plants. It also announced its plan to develop four brand-new power stations.

These epoches, EDF looks like an unlikely white knight. The market value of the company has collapsed, from more than EUR1 50 bn( PS132bn) in 2008 to roughly EUR3 0bn( PS26bn) today, and the French nuclear manufacture is facing an existential crisis. Because many of the 58 nuclear reactors in France were built in the 1970 s, they are now contacting the end of their lifespan simultaneously. Not merely is France’s nuclear manufacture facing the costs of decommissioning, who the hell is grossly underestimated, but almost no new nuclear power stations are being built. At present, nuclear energy renders about 75% of France’s electricity, so the potential for a disastrous energy shortfall is growing by the day.

To make troubles worse, EDF’s attempt to build its first brand-new nuclear power plants for years has turned into an shame. Flamanville, on France’s northern coast, has been beset by overruns since construction started in 2007. It is currently projected to cost EUR1 0.5 bn( PS9. 2bn)- a steal to report to Hinkley, but still three times its original fund. The Flamanville reactor is a new European pressurised reactor( EPR ), the same troublesome intend that is planned for Hinkley.

Magnin, the chairman who resigned from the board of EDF last year, told him that the company ascertains Hinkley Point as crucial to attesting” that nuclear and EDF are still a reality for the 21 st century “. He included:” If it cultivates, it could be good business. But there is a risk that it won’t work, and then everyone loses .”


The financial cope that EDF struck with the British in October 2013 to fund the project- which, in Magnin’s words, amounts to the British taxpayer funding France’s energy needs- was still of the more controversial elements of the Hinkley deal.

Given its commitment to building Hinkley Point C, the government had no choice but to represent EDF an offering that was too good to balk. It offered to guarantee EDF a attached rate for each unit of energy produced at Hinkley for its first 35 years of operation. In 2012, the guaranteed cost- known as the” impres cost”- was set at PS92. 50 per megawatt hour( MWh ), which would then rise with inflation.( One MWh is roughly equivalent to the energy used by around 330 residences in one hour .)

This is necessary that if the wholesale price of electricity throughout the country descends below PS92. 50, EDF will receive an extra payment from the consumer as a “top-up” to replenish the chink. This will be added to electricity proposals around the country- even if you aren’t receiving electricity from Hinkley Point C, you will still be making a payment to EDF. The current wholesale price is around PS40 per MWh. If “and theres” no inflation since 2012, “consumers interests” would be paying an EDF tax of around PS52. 50 per MWh produced at Hinkley. However, because it is linked to inflation, the impres toll has already been increasing since 2012.( The toll will be reduced by PS3 if EDF develops another brand-new reactor in Sizewell in Suffolk, as it is planning to do .)

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A concrete batching plant at the Hinkley Point C building area, September 2016. Photograph: Bloomberg via Getty Images

In short, instead of using taxpayers’ money to fund a state aid for EDF, the governmental forces negotiated a bargain whereby the energy shopper foots the legislation. Established that virtually every taxpayer in the UK is an electricity consumer, the mark is primarily academic. Additionally, beings in a lower taxation bracket often use a same sum of energy to higher earners, effectively creating a regressive levy.” The impres price was defined when superpower tolls were very high. They signed the contract when there was a bubble ,” Juan Rodriguez, an analyst at equity research conglomerate AlphaValue, told me.” It’s a bright cope for EDF .”( By contrast, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy maintains that” the governmental forces negotiated a competitive bargain “. A spokesperson from EDF told me:” The UK Government agrees that Hinkley will be delivered price for money for both consumers and that the overall costs of the electricity organisation are lower with nuclear as part of the mixture than without it .”)

The deal ogles specially bad when compared with the current cost of renewable energy. As Hinkley’s pricetag saves rising, the cost of energy prevents descending. And, as a recent report from the public accounts committee pointed out, although energy costs are descending, this just drives up the top-up pay to EDF.” No one was protecting the interests of energy customers in doing the batch ,” the report memorandum.


In December 2013, the European commissioning decided that the payments to EDF were so large-scale that they could distort the electricity toll across the whole of Europe, and launched an investigation into the spate. The arising document, published in 2014, can be read as a 33,000 -word attempt by the EU to save the UK from its own poor negotiating.

The commission elevated several issues. First, it stated that the payout to EDF would give the company a huge and unjustifiable advantage over its opponents. The strike rate agreement was designed” to only annihilate sell jeopardies from the commercial pleasure of power generation “.

Second, it have also pointed out that EDF has been meticulous in passing on just as much threat as possible to the British government. The contract included a territory insure for any obligation that EDF required from the financial markets to fund structure of the flora. Separately, if a nuclear disaster affects Hinkley, EDF is also shielded.” We’re insuring it, so if there is a disaster, it comes back to the public ,” adds Molly Scott Cato, the MEP.” Nuclear never has and cannot exist in a private marketplace setting .”

One of the most serious concerns in the EU’s assessment was over the forecasts for the “gap” between the wholesale energy rate and the impres cost. That gap is currently around PS50. Once Hinkley starts operating, the European Commission pointed out, EDF’s market share will be so substantial that it could have capacities necessary to control the wholesale energy grocery. Depending on the how the strike cost is calculated, there might be an “incentive”, the commission mentioned, for EDF to” behave strategically” to” affected by the cite toll “. For instance, if EDF abruptly sold a lot of electricity on to the market at a pre-planned duration, the wholesale price could sag significantly. The lower the wholesale price, “the worlds biggest” certain differences from the sterilized impres cost, and therefore the higher the” EDF excise” paid by customers. As the commission made it, there remained a question over how a” vertically incorporated operator” might” react to such an incentive frame “. EDF will have a duty to its shareholders to maximise its profits. But because the commission made very clear, at the same age, the company will have the capacity to move the wholesale energy marketplace at particular accurate experiences, in a way that could benefit shareholders substantially.

EDF declined to comment on this place. A spokesman for the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills said that the force regulator, Ofgem, would be responsible for omission of the wholesale electricity sell.” They have a variety of investigatory and enforcement powers at their dumping for the spotting and prevention of cost manipulation by market participants ,” told a spokesperson.

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